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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE ()F UTAH
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF \
UTAH, NATIONAL ASSOCIA- )1
TION,
Plainliff and Respondent,
VS,

I

EZRA C. LUNDAHL, INC., E. \ Case No.
CORDELL LUNDAHL, SHYR-\1· 11359
LEEN B. LUNDAHL, EZRA C.
LUNDAHL and LEATHA A.
LUNDAHL,
Defendants and Appellants. 1

I

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action brought under the Uniform Commercial Code to recover on a deposited check which
was dishonored by the Payor Bank but not charged
back nor notice given the depositor, and a counter claim
by the depositor growing out of said transaction.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VEll COURT
A verdict by the jury was returned in favor of ail
Defendants, but a judgment was granted by the court
to both parties.

RELIEF SOUGIIT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of judgment granted
Plaintiff against Defendant.

Lo

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant, Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., is a small
corporation with its principal place of business in Logan,
Utah and the Defendants, E. Cordell Lundahl and
Ezra C. Lundahl, are two of its owners and operators.
The Defendants, Shyrleen B. Lundahl and Leathn
A. Lundahl, are the wives of E. Cordell Lundaltl allll
Ezra C. Lundahl.
The Lundahl Corporation has, for many years
prior to this lawsuit, operated in Logan, Utah, for tbe
purpose of building and manufacturing farm machiner)·
and selling and disposing of same. It was so e11gagetl
in the summer of 1966. Its bank was the First Security
Bank of Utah N .A., Logan Branch. The individual
Lundahls in the month of l\'lay, 1964, gave to the Bank
a written guaranty (Pl. Ex. 2) for the Lundahl Corporation accounts.
2

rn the month of July, 1966, the defendants sold
snTral pieces of equipment to the Heathfield Equipment Ltd., of Kamloops, British Columbia (Tr. D4).
}ti each instance, they received a check for said sale,
ont> of which was in the amount of $8,121.88 (Tr. 94).
The check in the amount of $8,121.88 so received
by the defendants was deposited to the corporation
account (Tr. 94) on July 28th, 1966 (Def. Ex. 16sce back for detail) . This check was charged back by
!lie Hank to Defendant corporation's account on August
Ist. 1966, ( llank' s copy of charge back, Def. Ex. 17).
:\o notice was ever given to the Defendants or lheir
agents, nor was the check returned (Tr. 96, 135, 136,
I07, 194, 195 and 196). The chargeback of this lost
check caused an overdraft and E. Cordell Lundahl,
on demand from the Bank, signed a note for the amount
of this check ( R. 96) .
Co11siderable effort was made by both the Bank
and Lundahls to get a new check to replace the check
that was lost. On November 15, 1966, by letter (Pl.
Ex. 1) a new check in the amount of $8,100.00 was
scut to Lundahls. This check (P. Ex. 11) for $8,100.00
\\"as deposited to the Lundahl corporation account on
December 5th, 1966, (Pl. Ex. 3, Tr. 102) and the
monies placed directly in the Lundahl corporation
lll'COtmt.

\Vhile all of the above was taking place the Lundahls were attempting to sell their business to Hesston
L'orporation and a contract was finally entered into on
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July 29th, 1966, (Def. Ex. 19) which, besides other
provisions, provided (paragraph 4) that on or before
December 1st, 1966, Hesston would deposit with plai 11 _
tiff, in escrow, $187,000.00, which sum would be held
by the Bank for disposition in accordance with the
terms of the contract.
Paragraph 5 (a) provided that: Prior to .January
1st, 1967, Lundahls shall fully pay, satisfy or obta1u
release of all debts, wages, accounts, taxes, liabilitifs
which are owed by or outstanding against Lundahls.
Paragraph 5 ( c) provided that: Lundahls shall
furnish to Hesston and to the Hank, proof acceptable
to each of them
certifying that Lundahl has 1111
creditors.
Paragraph 8 set out this:
''On January 2, HW7, prm·ided sellers ]me
complied with the provisions of paragraph 5
hereof, Hesston shall direct said Hank to pay unto Lundahl the sum of Eighty Seven Thousand
( $8 7,000. 00) Dollars in full payment for the
property sold to Hesston under paragraph t)(al
hereof."
The check of $8,100.00 (Pl. Ex. 11) which wa~
deposited to Lundahls' account on December 5. 19titi,
(Pl. Ex. 3) was sent for collection to the Royal l~ank
of Canada by said Plaintiff Bank as shown by its eollection letter No. 34-13377 (Pl. Ex. 5) December .'i
1966. The Plaintiff, First Security Bank, reccin·d
notice dated December 9, 1966, (Pl. Ex. 6) from t!Ji
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Hoyal Bank of Canada "that the check was dishonoured
for non-sufficient funds on first presentation. '\Te will
continue to hold for payment, unless vou instruct us
otherwise."
The Lundahls were not given notice by the Bank
that the check was not paid when presented and they
knew nothing of this fact when the Hesston people
mel with the Lundahls and the .First Security Bank
to close out the purchase of the Lundahl business. The
meeting was set up for January 4, 1967, at the First
Security Bank in Logan, Utah. Prior to this date, on
December 30, 1966 (Tr. 103) the First Security Bank
had addressed a letter to Lundahls setting out all direct
obligations owed by Lundahls, being the amount of
$75,648.73 (Def. Ex. 21) and also a letter setting out
the contingent obligations owed by Lunclahls totaling
$2,892.87 (Def. Ex. 23). No mention was made of any
obligation for the check of $8,100.00 which had not been
pai1l and this fact was "\vell known by the Bank but
not known by the Lundahls (Tr. 105). At the meeting
at the Bank on January 4, 1967, a letter of instruction
was dictated and written by Hesston (Def. Ex. 20,
Tr. 104-105) to the First Security Bank referring to
its contract with Lundahls, a copy of which they had
sent to the Bank. (Def. Ex. 19). Hesston, in said
letter, referred to the amounts set out in Defendants'
Exhibits 21 and 23, being the declared, direct and contingent obligations owed or claimed owed by Lundahls. It (Def. Ex. 20) directed transfers of certain
monies to Lundahls pursuant t o paragraph 8 of
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Lundahl-Hesston agreement (Def. Ex. 19) and directed the Lundahls to make payment to the Bank of
$78,648.73 for direct obligations and $2,892.87 of
contingent obligations. The Bank, with full knowledge,
still said nothing about the unpaid check of $8, 100.00
that it had credited to the checking account of Lundahls
and for which it had received a notice that it had not
been paid on presentation (Tr. 105, 127, 128 and 204)
The Lundahls, at the meeting January 4, 1967,
contested the amount to be paid to the Bank shown
on Defendants' Exhibit 21, and particularly the
last item which represented a note signed for the "lost
check" in the amount of $8,121.88. As a result of
Defendants' objections the interest on the $8,121.88
was deducted by the Plaintiff Bank and the pay-off
was made as shown by Defendants' checks (Defendants' Ex. 24). Mr. Salisbury of the Bank admitted
(Tr. 61-62) that the interest was waived on that day.
At this meeting of January 4, 1967, the Hesston
deal was closed and the Lundahls paid to the ·First
Security Bank, the Plaintiff herein, four checks (Defendants Ex. 24) for a total of $78,402.55 as payment
in full of all of their obligations, both direct and contingent and the Lundahls asked for the return of their
guaranty and other papers (Pl. Ex. 2) (Tr. 132, 134,
209 and 210). It was to be returned later with other
papers.
After this January 4, 1967, meeting, the Plaintiff
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Bank received the following letters from the Royal
Hank of Canada:
(a) Plaintiff's exhibit 7, dated January u,
19li7, being a letter referring to its previous letter of
December 9, 1966, (Pl. Ex. 6) and the non-payment
of the check.
1\)67,

( b) Plaintiff's exhibit 8, dated February 1,
another letter regarding the same subject matter.

( c) Plaintiff's exhibit 9, dated February o,
1967, being another letter from the Royal Bank of
Canada about said check.
( d) Plaintiff's exhibit 10, dated .February 10,
1967, being another letter from the Royal Bank of
Canada about the check sent for collection by Plaintiff Bank on December 5, 1966, and this time the check
of $8,100.00 was returned to the Plaintiff Bank.
The Plaintiff Bank by letter dated February 20,
1967 (Pl. Ex. 13) sent to Clay and Hancey, Certified
Public Accountants for Lundahls, the check for
$8,100.00 which was charged back to Lundahls' account
as of that date and an overdraft created. The collection
letter (Pl. Ex. 5) of First Security Bank has the Bank's
rubber stamp marked upon it stating "returned unpaid
February 23, 1967". A letter to the Lundahls from
First Security Bank dated February 23, 1967 (Pl.
Ex. 15) refers to the charge back and a withdrawal of
$7,000.00 on February 13, 1967. In regard to this
withdrawal the record shows (Tr. 91) that E. Cordell
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Lundahl went to the Plaintiff Bank after a telephone
call to his home which was received by his wife (Tr.
91) and met Norman Salisbury. This took place about
the 10th of February, 1967. Mr. Lundahl ~was told for
the first time at this meeting that there was trouble
about the check. They had a second visit about a week
later (Tr. 92) where the Bank claimed that they had
received the check back and wanted E. Cordell Lundahl
to sign a note for it, which he refused to do. He state)
that this meeting on the 10th of February, 1967, was
the first time he had ever heard about any trouble witli
this l)econd check. He talked with his father after the
10th of February, 1967. His father (Tr. 206) says
that when he was told for the first time that the check
had not been paid, he was fearful that the Bank would
"glom" onto the last of the money in the Bank, and
on the 13th of February, 1967, he drew out $7,000.00.
He left some money in the Bank for outstanding checks
(Tr. 207). The amount left was $893.93 (Tr. 207)
and the Bank obtained this sum when it charged the
check back.
From the above facts the Plaintiff Bank tiled a
complaint against the Lundahls with two causes of
action to which the Defendants answered and filed a
counterclaim for the amount the Bank obtained when
they charged the check back.
From these facts and pleadings the court submitted
to the jury the following interrogatories: (Rec. 37)
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"I. Did the plaintiff exen.'ise reasonable, ordi-

nary care and proceed in good faith in handling the transaction in question? Answer
yes or no.

2. If your answer to number one was no, then

please set out here your detailed finding as to
just how and in what respects, if any, said
plaintiff was negligent or otherwise failed to
perform, in handling such transaction, should
you so find.

3. If you made a finding in answer to the pre-

vious question then here consider the question
of damage and award defendants such damage, if any you find, as was proximately
caused by plaintiff's omissions, if any you
found.

4. 'Vas there a complete accord and satisfac-

tion between the parties on or about January
4, 1967, whereby all accounts were settled
and compromised between the parties, including a promise, if any you find, on the part
of the bank to surrender up the written guarantee? Answer yes or no."

To interrogatory No. 1, the jury answered:
"No."
To interrogatory No. 2 the jury answered:
"I. We, the jury, find the First Security Bank

was negligent when the first check went
through the 'Bank' after the first deposit and
was not identified as a foreign item.

2. We find the Bank was negligent when the

Bank didn't notify Lundhal's Inc. about the
overdraft caused by the loss of the first check.
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3. YV e find the Bank was negligent because thev
failed to notify Lundhals Inc. in the tiin~

prescribed by law, or a reasonable time, about
the second check not being honored by the
Royal Bank of Canada."
·

To interrogatory No. 3, the jury answered:
"We, the jury, find the amount of $8\)3.98
which was taken by the bank from the account
of Lundahls Inc. be awarded the defendants".
To Interrogatory No .4, the jury answered:
"'Ve, the jury, agree on the first part of question No. 4. There was complete accord and satisfaction between the parties on Jan. 4, 1967. We
find that the guarantee was included in said
agreement." (Rec. 44-45)
The court approved the findings of the jury (Rec.
68) and in substance held that the defendants because
of said jury's findings, were entitled to a judgment of
$893.93, the amount taken by the Bank when the
chargeback was made from the Defendants' account.
However, the court two weeks later and on motion of
the Plaintiff, gave to Plaintiff a judgment of $7,20(i.07
and directed that Defendants' judgment be subtracted
from Plaintiff's judgment and Plaintiff be given a
judgment of $6,312.14, together with interest at 6;'~
per annum from February 20, 1967. (Rec. 76). It
is from this latter judgment and the Findings and
Conclusions of the court upon which that judgment
is based that this appeal is taken.
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STATE1\1ENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT HAVING EXPRESSLY
ADOPTED THE FINDINGS OF THE JURY
WAS BOUND TO FIND A NO CAUSE OF
ACTION ON BOTH PLAINTIF}''S FIRST
AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION AND
NOT ITS SECOND CAUSE ONLY.
A. THE JURY HA YING FOUND THAT THE
PLAINTIFF BANK \VRONGFULL Y TOOK
FRUM THE DEFENDANTS $893.93 \VHEN"
THE PLAINTIFF CHARGED BACK TO
DEFENDANTS' BANK AC C 0 U N T A
CHECK FOR $8,100.00, WHICH CHARGE
BACK NOT ONLY TOOK FROM DEFENDANTS' BANK ACCOUNT $893.93 BUT
CAUSED AN OVERDRAFT OF $7,206.07,
AND THE JURY HAVING FOUND THE
PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT IN SUCH
TRANSACTION, IT \VAS ERROR FOR
THE COURT TO GRANT THE NEGLIGENT PLAINTIFF A JUDGMENT FOR
SAID OVERDRAFT OF $7,206.07 GRU\VING OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION.
B. THE

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
AWARDING TO THE PLAINTIFF $7,206.07
FOR AN OVERDRAFT CREATED BY
THE PLAINTIFF'S OWN NEGLIGENT
11

l
TRANSACTION 'VAS CLEARLY ERROR
AND CONTRARY TO THE JURY'S F1NDING OF FACT WHICH HELD TI-IAT ALL
ACCOUNTS BETWEEN THE PLAINTUF
AND DEFENDANT \VERE SETTLED II\
AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION O~
JANUARY 4, 1967.
C. THE COURT, AFTER HAYING ADOPTED
THE JURY'S FINDING THAT THERE
WAS A COMPLETE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BETWEEN THE PART1E~
ON J ANDARY 4th, 1967, ERRED 'VHEN l'1
DISMISSED THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AGAINST ONLY THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS AND NOT
AGAINST THE CORPORATE DEFENDANT AS WELL.
D. THE COURT HA YING REQUESTED THE
JURY TO MAKE SPECIAL FINDINGS OF
FACT IS BOUND TO APPLY THOSE
FINDINGS TO ALL ISSUES OF FACT
\VHICH T H 0 S E JURY FINDINGS
'VOULD DETERMINE.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPHETATION OF THE UNIFORM C01\il\1ERCIAL
CODE, 70A-4-212 UTAH CODE ANNOTATRD
12

I
I
1

I
I
I

1

IN NOT DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN A RIGHT TO "CHARGE BACK" AND
A RIGHT TO "REFUND."
(1958), AND

A. \VHILE U'l'AH CODE 70A-4-212 PROY IDES THAT A BANK HAS A RIGHT TO
A "CHARGE BACK" EVEN IF IT ACTS
NEGLIGENTLY, IT ALSO CLEARLY
PROVIDES THAT A BANK LOSES SUCH
RIGHT IF IT DOES NOT "ACT BY ITS
MIDNIGHT DEADLINE OR vVITHI:i'-T A
LONGER REASON ABLE TilVIE AFTER lT
LEARNS THE FACTS," AND THE JUR¥
EXPRESSLY FOUND THAT THE BA:N.h.
FAILED TO NOTIFY LUNDAHL'S, lNC.,
"\\TITHIN THE TilVIE PRESCRIBED ny·
LA'V OR A REASONABLE TI.ME ABOUT
THE SECOND CHECK NOT BEING HONORED BY THE ROYAL BANK OF CANADA, THE BANK'S RIGHT TO CHARGE
BACK WAS LOST.
B. THE UTAH CODE PROVIDES THAT A

BANK HAS A RIGHT TO A "REFUND"
ONLY 'i\THERE THE BANK IS NOT NEGLIGENT, AND THE JURY AND COURT
HAVING EACH EXPRESSLY FOUND
THE BANK WAS NEGLIGENT IN ITS
HANDLING OF DEFENDATS' CHECK,
THE BANK HAD NO RIGHT TO A "REFUND."
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT HAYING EXPUE~SL1
ADOPTED THE FINDINGS OF THE J lJH\
WAS BOUND TO FIND A NO CAUSE O/
ACTION ON BOTH PLAINTIFF'S F1US'1
AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION AND
NOT ITS SECOND CAUSE ONLY.
A. THE JURY HAVING FOUND THAT THE
PLAINTIFF BANK WRONGFULLY TOOK
FRO.M THE DEFENDANTS $893.93 \VHEK
THE PLAINTIFF CHARGED BACK TO
DEFENDANTS' BANK AC C 0 U N T A
CHECK FOR $8,100.00, \VHICH CHAHG1
BACK NOT ONLY TOOK FROlVI DEFENDANTS' BANK ACCOUNT $893.93 .BL'T
CAUSED AN OVERDRAFT OF $7,206.07,
AND THE JURY HAVING FOUND THE
PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT IN SUCH
TRANSACTION, IT WAS ERROR FOR
THE COURT TO GRANT THE NEGLIGENT PLAINTIFF A JUDGMENT FOR
SAID OVERDRAFT OF $7,206.07 GROWING OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION.
The lower court attempted to reconcile two irrecon
cilable nositions. This resulted in the untenable situation of the court adopting and sustaining the special
findings of the jury, which were all found in fayor
L
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of the defendant, while the court at the same time and
based upon the same isolated transaction, granted a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The lower court expressly accepted and sustained
the special findings of fact by the jury, and said so on
seYeral occasions. At the first meeting of the court
and counsel following the jury verdict, on June 10,
Hl68, the court stated (Tr. 280):
"I want to announce publicly and on the record
that I propose to receive this verdict unless somebody can talk me out of it."
Two weeks later, on June 24, 1968, the court agam
stated (TR. 297) :

"'Vell, gentlemen, in this case I guess tpe
court will have to resolve the matter in order that
one of the parties may appeal. First of all, the
court accepts in its entirety the findings and conclusions of fact made by the jury ... "
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the
court stated (Rec. 68) :

"And, the court, having considered said Special
Verdict as returned by said jury, approves said
findings, and now enters its o,wn Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law ... "
The court also stated in Finding No. 18 (Rec. 73) :
"The court finds that the special findings and
verdict of the jury are true and correct."
This, then is not a case where the court has granted
a Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict, or for some

15

other reason has reversed the findings of the jury, fo"
here the court expressly adopted the jury findings a)
true and correct. Yet, after such explicit staternenb
by the court, it nullified those very findings by its erroneous judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The cour\
requesetd the jury to make special findings of fad
on four issues, and there should be no confusio11 c011 _
cerning their findings, for due to the court's proptr
requirement that the ambiguous statement "we feel"
be replaced by "we find", the jury restated and emphasized their unanimous findings in open court. TR.
270-275). The interrogatories and the answers of the
jury are set out in full at the conclusion of the statement of facts.
A clear and careful reading of the jury findings
is convincing proof that the jury were unanimousl~
convinced that the Plaintiff Bank was negligent in its
handling of both checks of the Defendants. 'The jury
further found that as a result of the negligent transactions, the Bank lost its legal right to charge back
the $893.93 taken from the Defendants' Bank account
and required a return of that amount to the Defendant.
The court in its Conclusions of Law No. 5 (Rec. 74)
expressly found the facts to be as stated by the jury:
"That the plaintiff 'vas negligent in certain
respects in its handling of said 2nd check."
The court also found, in Finding of Fact No. 8 (Rec.
70):
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"That plaintiff failed to notify Lundahls Inc.
in the manner prescribed by law or a reasonable
time about Check . Two not being honored by
the Royal Bank of Canada . . . ,,
rel, even after acknowledging the negligence of the
Plaintiff Bank, the court awarded it a judgment for
$7,:W6.07, the full amount requested in its pleadings.
The determination resulted in a ridiculous paradox,
with the court requiring the Bank to return all the
money it took from the Defendants' bank account, while
at the same time awarding to the Bank all the money
it tried to take but could not get. In other words, it
was to the benefit of the negligent Bank that the full
$8,100.00 was not in the Defendants' bank account
when the check was charged back, for the Bank \Vas
required to return all that it had taken. And if all of
the money had been taken, it would all have had to
have been returned.
It is a preposterous proposition to argue that such
a contradictory determination is in accordance with
law and justice. For there was only one transaction
involved, and either the Bank was negligent or it wa~
not. If it was, it must suffer the legal consequences of
its act. And that consequence is spelled out in the
Gniform Commercial Code, recently adopted as Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, Title 70A, which provisions
are discussed in Point II herein. The jury found the
Bank was negligent. The court adopted the jury finding and also made its own independent finding that
the Bank was negligent in its actions. Therefore, it
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is abundantly clear that the Bank must meet the legal
consequences of its act, as provided in the U niforrn
Commercial Code.
To require the .Bank to return the $89~Hl3 takeu,
while at the same time awarding it the $7,206.07 not
taken, is certainly not consistent nor fair. The .Banh
was the party found negligent, not the Defendant~,
yet it was allowed by the court to benefit by its negligent act. The obvious intent of the jury was to fully
reimburse the Defendant for all that it had lost by
the improper charge back of the Bank, yet the coun
erroneously attempted to "divide the pie" instead of
awarding it to one party or the other as justice required.
It is not justice nor the intent of the law to ask both
parties to share in a loss where only one party is at
fa ult. Here the only reasonable conclusion is that sirn:t
the jury and the court required the Bank to return tl1~
$893.93 wrongfully taken, the Bank cannot possibly
be entitled to an additional $7,206.07 lost by its negligent act.
B. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COl'RT
AWARDING TO THE PLAINTIFF $7.~06.07
FOR AN OVERDRAFT CREATED HY
THE PLAINTIFF'S OWN NEGLIGENT
TRANSACTION WAS CLEARLY ERROR
AND CONTRARY TO THE JURY'S FINDING OF FACT WHICH HELD THAT ALL
ACCOUNTS BET,VEEN THE PLAINTJFI
AND DEFENDANT WERE SETTLED IN
1
'
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AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION ON
J ANDARY 4, 1967.
The jury made a specific finding concerning the extent of the accord and satisfaction. (Rec. 45, Rec. 67) :
"4. Was there a complete accord and satisfaction between the parties on or about January
4, 1967, whereby all accounts were settled and
compromised between the parties, including a
promise, if any you find, on the part of the bank
to surrender up the written guaranty? Answer
Yes or No."
"Answer: We, the jury, agree on the first part
of Question No. 4-there was complete accord
and satisfaction between the parties on Jan.
4, 1967. We find that the guaranty was included
in this said agreement." (Emphasis added) .

Here the jury's finding determined that all accounts
between the parties were settled as of January 4th, 1967.
But the court, even though expressly adopting those
findings, ruled to the contrary and reversed the jury's
finding of fact. (Rec. 72) . In its Finding of Fact No.
15 the court held that the defendant corporation and
the individual named Defendants entered into an agreement with the Hesston Corporation, Inc., which required that the Defendants "obtain releases of all debts,
wages, accounts, taxes, liabilities and other obligations
which were owed or outstanding against them", and that
pursuant to that agreement the interested buyer, Hesston Corporation, Inc., deposited certain monies in
' Plaintiff Bank in consideration thereof, to be used to
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pay any indebtednesse owing by the Defendants, pril!cipally to the Plaintiff Bank. The court specitkdh
concluded:

"That included in said debts was a note from
defendants to the Bank in the sum of $8,121.88
representing Check One, which had been lost
after having been sent to Defendants by the
Bank, but Check Two in the sum of $8,100.0U '
was 'Specifically omitted from said settlement
for reasons aforesaid, and was not a part of the
accord and satisfaction which took place at a
meeting which followed on January 4, 1967."
(Emphasis added) .
In Finding No. 16 the court further found:
"Hesston Corporat~on, Inc. was delivered
statements from the .First Security Bank setting
out in full all liabilities which were owed bv the
Defendants, both direct and contingent, being
the sums to-wit: $75,648.73 and $2,892.97 (but
which did not include Check Two) at which time
the plaintiff agreed with the defendants in consideration of immediate payment, to accept the
sum of $75,509.78 on direct liabilities and the
sum of $2,892.87 on contingent liabilities as iu
an accord and satisfaction of all accounts due and
owing to said Bank by the Defendants ... '
(Emphasis added) .
The court submitted a specific interrogatory to the
jury upon the precise issue involved here, but didn t
like the answer the jury arrived at, so disregarded thr
jury determination. The court is not free to disregard
the jury findings, as is more fully discussed in Point
ID, infra.
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The court clearly stated the reason for submitting
thi~ interrogatory at the time it instructed the jury
as to how to make its findings. The court instructed
the jury that the burden of proof on all of the questions, one through four, was on the Defendant (Rec.
37), which burden the Defendant met according to
the answers of the jury. The court then added: (Instruction Number 4, Rec. 42) :
"The main reason we have the jury here is
so that you may apply the rule of credibility:
'Vho are you going to believe? You have a right
and it's your duty to weigh the testimony of the
witnesses and examine all the written exhibits
and determine where the truth of the case lies.
There is no magic formula that I can tell you
how to determine who to believe and where the
truth is in this case, and that's why the jury
system exists. "\Ve bring in eight disinterested
persons and ask them to find out and determine
who's told the truth, to us street language, which
of these exhibits are entitled to credibility, and
a fair and just verdict render in the interests of
justice. You observe the witnesses on the stand,
you observe their demeanor, you observe their
interest in the result of the case or the lack of
it, and you yourself must resolv~ that."
The jury, following the court's instruction, obviously
believed the Defendants' story and disbelieved the
Plaintiffs. But the court then disregarded the jury
verdict and made its own finding which is directly contray to the jury's finding. When challenged on this
aetion by counsel for the Defendant the following
colloquy took place:
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(Tr. 302):
"~R: MANN: \Vell, then what good wa~

the JU!'Y, Judge 1 \Vhat good was any returu
followmg up of the jury?

ur

. T!IE COURT: VV ~11, that p~rticular thmg
d1dn t need to be submitted to a Jury. I'll hare
to concede that, because there's no question but
what the bank got the 893 offset. That was just
a waste of judicial effort, that part."

1

'

As is discussed in Point ID, the court is bound by
the jury's findings of fact, and here the court was clearly
erroneous in finding contrary to the jury's findings of
fact.
C. THE COURT, AFTER HAVING ADOPTED
THE JURY'S FINDING THAT THERE
WAS A COMPLETE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES
ON JANUARY 4th, 1967, ERRED \VHEN IT
DISMISSED THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AGAINST ONLY THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS AND NO'l'
AGAINST THE CORPORATE DEFENDANT AS WELL.
For a number of years the Bank had made large
loans to the Defendant corporation, and in 1964< re·
quested the individual Defendants, namely Ezra C.
Lundahl and Leatha A. Lundahl, his wife, and E.
Cordell Lundall and Shyrleen B. Lundahl, his wife,
to sign a guarantee. The individual Defendants did
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sign a guarantee on May 20, 1964, which guaranteed

that they would individually insure payment on any
debts incurred by the corporation up to $110,000.0J
if the corporation defaulted. (Exhibit No. 2). The
.Jlll'Y expressly found that the guarantee was discussed
at the accord and satisfaction meeting on January 4,
1967, and that the guarantee was to be returned to the
individual Defendants by the Bank. (R. 45, and also
i1t Rec. 67) :

The jury had been instructed earlier by the judge
io determine which witnesses were telling the trulh.
(Rec. 42, Instruction No. 4) .
The jury obviously believed the Defendants' version of the facts in requiring that the guarantee must
be returned. The court also made specific findings concerning the guarantee. (Rec. 71-73) . Finding No. 14
recites the backround of the guarantee. Finding No.
lU held (Rec. 72 and 73 No. 16):
"16. That on or about the 4th day of January,
1967, a meeting was held in the First Security
Bank at Logan, Utah, wherein Hesston Corporation, Inc., was delivered statements from
the First Security Bank setting out in full all
liabilities which were owed by the Defendants,
both direct and contingent, being the sums, towit: $75,648.73 and $2,892.87 (but which did
not include Check Two,) at which time the Plaintiff agreed with the Defendants, in consideration
of immediate payment, to accept the sum of
$75,509.78 on direct liabilities and the sum of
$2,892.87 on countingent liabilities as an accord
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and ~atisfaction of all ac.counts due and owing
to said Bank ~y the .Defend3:nts, which agreed
amounts were irmuedmtely paid by the Defendants to Plaintiff as a payment in full satisfactio 11
of all liabilities whatsoever that the plaintiff had
against the Defendants or any of them, except
for said Check Two of $8,100.00, which had not
then been returned unpaid. 1lhat at said time the
Plaintiff agreed to deliver to said Defcnda11t 8
the guaranty, a copy of which is attached to
Plaintiff's complaint and marked "Exhibit A'
and paid notes. The Plaintiff, after said time,
returned the notes, but said guaranty has never
been returned to the Defendants, and the Plaintiff is estopped from using or asserting any righb
under said purported guaranty." (Emphasis
added).
Once again both the jury and the judge found for
the Defendant on an issue where the credibility of the
parties was involved. Yet the final judgment of the
court implies the Defendants were dishonest in some
unexplained way.
The guaranty was obviously for the benefit of the
Bank. It is inconceivable that the Bank would agree
to yield up a guarantee binding the individual Defendants if it believed the Corporate Defendant was
still indebted to it on a legitimate claim. The finding
of the court and of the jury are absolute that the guarantee was discussed during the meeting on January
4th, 1967, and that the Bank agreed to yield up the
guarantee. The Defendants at that time believed the
check had been paid, as they had never received notice
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of dishonor, a fact determined by both the court and
by the jury. And since the De.fondant was unaware
the check had not been paid, the burden was upon the
Plaintiff Bank to list it with all of the other direct and
contingent liabilities of Defendant. But it is an undisputed fact that the check was never listed. The
silence of the Bank cannot be ignored, especially where
its silence was to hide its own negligence. It received
over $78,000.00 from Hesston Corporation as final
settlement of all claims, direct and contingent, owing
by Lundahl' s Inc. to the Bank, and the Bank feared
that if it suddenly tried to recover for a check which
was even then nearly one month late in being charged
back, that the Defendants or Hesston Corporation or
both would become disgusted with the Bank and caH
off the whole settlement. The Bank was anxious to get
its hands on the $78,000.00 right away, so never did
raise the issue of the second check's dishonor until
well after the arrangement with Hesston was final
and could not be revoked. Yet it tried to recover from
all of the Defendants, and even in court denied it had
ever agreed to yield up the guarantee signed by the
individual Defendants. When the jury and the court
found that the Bank had in fact agreed to yield up
that guarantee they had to believe the Defendants'
version of the facts. And to later allow the Bank, who
misstated the true facts, to recover on the check they
did not dare discuss at the proper time, is directly contradictory to the effect of the other findings. The Bank
should be estopped to deny its silence, and should be
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refused a recovery on the check against the Corporate
Defendant just as it was against the individual Defendants.
D. THE COURT HAVING REQUESTED THE
JURY TO ~IAKE SPECIAL FINDINGS OF
FACT IS BOUND TO APPLY THOSE
FINDINGS TO ALL ISSUES OF FACT
WHICH T H 0 SE JURY FINDINGS
WOULD DETERMINE.
0 btaining a special verdict from a jury is a time
honored method of determining the facts of the case
in Utah. In 1885 the Supreme Court of Utah, in the
case of Smith vs. Ireland, 7 P. 749, distinguished between general and special verdicts. There the court
stated:
"In case of a general verdict the court states
the law applicable to the facts before they are
found by the jury, and in a special verdict the
jury finds the facts first and the court declares
the law applicable to them afterwards. In either
case the jury is judge of the facts and the court
of the law."
Yet in this case the court is assuming both rolc1
and seeks to be the "Judge of the Facts" as well as of
the law. Further on in that same decision the court
states the general rule:
"The authorities are to the effect that the court
will not set aside a verdict unless satisfied it i;;
against a clear preponderance of the evidence.
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The lower court here agreed with and adopted the
jury's findings, so had no basis for setting them aside.
Later Utah decisions have further defined the relationship between the judge and the jury and the
duties of each where a special verdict is involved. In
the case of Petty vs. Clark, 129 P 2<l 568 ( 1942), the
jury was requested by the court to answer six special
interrogatories concerning what statements were indude<l in a contract for a sale of a drugstore. Ti;c
jury found by a vote of six to two that a certain r;aragraph was not a part of the contract, but the eourt
disagreed, believing that the paragraph in question
was a part of the contract. The court concluded that
the case was in equity, and that the decision of the
jury was not binding, but only advisory. Upon appeal
the Supreme Court reversed that determination stating:
(page 569, right hand column)
"There was sufficient evidence to justify the
jury's findings; the findings of the jury are,
therefore governing in the case."
Defending the parties' rights to a constitutionally
guaranteed jury trial, the court added: (page 570, left
hand column)
"Where the issues are legal issues, the fact
that equitable relief may be prayed for, to carry
into effect the judgments based upon the legal
issues, is not sufficient to deprive either party
of .his rights
to have the legal issues submitted to
,,a Jury.
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This decision carefully pin-points the divisiou uf
duties of the court and jury in a case involving a spet:ial
verdict, clearly holding that the jury properly <leeides
the issues of fact where an equitable claim is joined
with the legal claims. In our case, the lower eourl
finally turned to equity for support for its decisioll .
In its original Findings of Fact the court listed sixtecu
findings, but it later amended the findings to inelude ,
seventeen through nineteen. In finding number seventeen the court stated: (Rec. 73)
" ... the corporate defendant has been aud will
continue to be unjustly enriched unless compelled to make repayment to the bank for the
amount of Check Two, less the amount received
by the Bank by charge back and less the damages fixed by the jury." (Emphasis added) .
How could the Defendant possibly have been "uu·
justly enriched"? The Bank took money from the De·
fendants' account, and both the jury and the court
found that the money was improperly taken by the
Bank. They impliedly found that the Bank was ''m1justly enriched" by that amount, and required a return
of the money to prevent the Bank from being unjust!)
enriched. The Bank being neligent, and taking mone~
that did not belong to it, had to give it back. The
$893.93 it was required to return was only part of
the $8,100.00 lost by the Bank's negligence. The other
$7 ,206.07 was another part of the same total, and
there is no reason to treat the two amounts different!~-.
for the total amount was lost by the one isolated transaction.

28

1

A similar situation arose in the case of King vs.
rets Cab Inc., 295 P2d 605 (Kansas 1956). There
the lower court set aside a special finding of fact by
the jury and entered a judgment for the plaintiff,
contrary to the jury findings. The Kansas Supreme
Court said in reversing the judgment: (page 610 left
hand column)

''The court set aside the answer to special
question No. 1. Apparently the court felt that
the answer was not definite and certain, was ambiguous, and left to speculation what the jury
meant by its answer when considered with the
answer to special question No. 2, and the general
verdict. After setting aside that answer, the
court entered judgment on the general verdict
in favor of the plaintiff. This it could not do.
Assuming that the answer to question No. 1 was
a finding of negligence on the part of the plaintiff, the trial court could not ignore specific separate findings which would bar recovery, and consider only the finding of negligence on the part
of defendant and render judgment on the latter.
To do so, the trial court would be substituting
its judgment for that of the jury, thereby denying the defendant the right to a trial by jury
on the issue of contributory negligence." (Emphasis added) .
Utah Rule 49(a) governing special verdicts is patterned after and is exactly the same wording as Rule
-1<9 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Federal Rule has been interpreted on many occasions,
as discussed in the treatise Federal Practice and Prncnl 11 rc, by Barron and Holtzoff, Volume 2B. Follow-
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ing are several comments included there which <lefilli
the application of this rule:
'·And of outstanding importance is the laci
that the definite factual findings furnish a prac
tical, concrete basis for the appellate court 1
evaluation of the case on review. If the onh
error involves a point of law or a misapplicatiu
of law to the facts by the trial judge, the necei·
sity for a new trial should be eliminated." IP.'
1

330).

That statement would indicate that the findings ot
the court in this case should be reversed and that a ne11
trial is not necessary, for the findings of the jury are
clear and unequivocable, and the only error is the mis·
application of law by the court.

"If there is conflict in the answers given by the
jury it is not the province of the court to make
additional findings of fact in an attempt to recon·
cile the answers.

If the jur;y finds the facts on the controlli1111
issues, and there is no contradictory finding, tlti'
court is authorized, under Rule S8, to enta 11 11
appropriate ;udgment on the special verdict in
conformity u;ith the ;ury findings." ( P. 351-3j21. !
(Emphasis added) .
j

"A judgment entered on a special verdicl
should not be set aside u 11lcss the ansu;ers on tltt
specific issues are clearl.11 against tlze u;eiqht o! ·
the ei..'idence. It has been held that if special issues .
were submitted to the jury without object~on. a
party may not complain on appeal that the Jury'
findings were opposed to the weight and pre·
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pon<lerance of the evidence." ( P. 353) ( Emphasis added) .
In 53 Am. J ur. 758, Trial, Sec. 1094, the concept
of '"minimum correction" by a court is discussed:
"VVhile the practice of amending verdicts in
matters of form is one of long standing, based
on principles of the soundest public policy in
the furtherance of justice, it is strictly limited
tu cases where the jury have expressed their
meaning in an informal manner. rPhe co,urt has
no power to supply substantial omissions, a;id
the amendment in all cMes must be such as to
make the verdict conform to the real intent of
the jury. The judge cannot, under the guise of
amending the verdict, invade the province of the
jur,1; or substitute his verdict fur theirs. After the
amendment the verdict must be not what the
judge things it ought to have been, but what
the the jury intend it to be. Their actual intent,
and not his notion of what they ought to have
intended, is the thing to be expressed and worked
out by the amendment." (Emphasis added).
One example of where the lower court reversed the
the jury finding by alllending their answer is where
the jury, in response to Interrogatory No. 4, found
that there was a "complete accord and satisfaction
between the parties." Yet the court concluded in its
Findings of Fact, No. 15 and No. 16, (Rec. 72 and
73) that the second check was not included in the accord
and satisfaction, which statement is definitely beyond
and contrary to the findings of the jury.
The authorities further state:
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"In jury trial cases it is the sole peculiar pr01
ince and function of the jury to determi11e or
decide disputed claims and questions of fact
arising in the case before it, and the law does nui
countenance any invasion or usurpation b,1; ti 11
court. of this p~·ovince and function of the jur11
to weigh_ the evidence and find the facts. The jun
have a right to draw from proved circumstance1
such conclusions as are natural and reasonahle.
( P. 144) (Emphasis added) .
The court declared the Defendant did not act 111
good faith when it withdrew its own money out of ill
checking account some two and a half months after !I
deposited the $8,100.00 check. Yet the jury heard all
the same evidence that the court heard, and in their
answer to Interrogatory No. 4 they unanimously found
the Defendant was "proximately" damaged by th1
Plaintiff by the full amount of money the Defenda11t
took. The Plaintiff was found to be negligent, and the•
jury determined that all accounts were settled betwet:1
the parties during the accord and satisfaction meetin~
on January 4th, 1967. These findings cannot he cfo· ·
regarded and tossed aside by the court to allow it tn
make its own findings on the very issues settled by the I
JUry.

The authorities are all agreed that such question 1
as "good faith" and "knowledge of events" are for tht ·
jury to determine, not for the court to decide. (Ser ,
e.g., 53 Am. Jur. 191, sec. 223, and page 192, sec. 22H
One of the great strengths of the American systeDI
of justice is that an idividual' s motives can be impartial!)
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determined by a jury comprised of his fellow citizens
rather than by a single judge. Here the jury answers
are clear and unequivocal, and no single judge shoul<l
be allowed to reverse their findings without a showing
that they are obviously in error-and no such showing
has been made here.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRE'IATION OF THE UNIFORM COMJHERCl ..:'.iL
CODE, 70A-4-212 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
(1953), AND IN NOT DISTINGUISHING BE'l'\VEEN A RIGHT TO "CHARGE BACK" AND
A RIGHT TO "REFUND."
A. 'VHILE UTAH CODE 70A-4-212 PROYIDES THAT A BANK HAS A RIGHT TO
A "CHARGE BACK" EVEN IF IT ACTS
NEGLIGENTLY, IT ALSO CLEARLY
PROVIDES THAT A BANK LOSES SUCH
RIGHT IF IT DOES NOT "ACT BY ITS
l\IIDNIGHT DEADLINE OR WITHIN A
LONGER REASONABLE TIME AFTER IT
LEARNS THE FACTS," AND THE JURY
EXPRESSLY FOUND THAT THE BANK
FAILED TO NOTIFY LUNDAHL'S, INC.,
\VITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY
LA'V OR A REASONABLE TI~fE ABOUT
THE SECOND CHECK NOT BEING HON33

ORED BY THE ROY AL BANK OF C..\X
ADA, THE BANK'S RIGHT TO CHAHGt
BACK WAS LOST.

The Plaintiff below relied upon Utah Code Ali·
notated 70A-4-212 as authority for its claim that
it had a right to charge back to the depositor's account
the full amount of the deposited check. This sectio 11
clearly does provide a collecting bank a right to charge
back an item as long as a settlernent rernains prurisional between the bank and the depositor. But as soon
as any settlement becomes final the bank loses its righl :
to charge back and, will from that time forward be
considered the owner of the check. 70A-4-212 ( 1) provides:

"Right of charge-back or refund.-( 1) If a
collecting bank has made provisional settlement
with its customer for an item and itself fails by
reason of dishonor, suspension of payments by
a bank or otherwise to receive a settlement for
the item which is or becomes final, the bank may
revoke the settlement given by it, charge back
the amount of any credit given for the item to I
its customer's account or obtain refund from ill
customer whether or not it is able to return the !
items if by its rnidnight deadline or with~n a '
longer reasonable time after it learns the facts :
it returns the items or sends notification of tli 1 :
facts. These ri,qhts to revoke, charge-bad" and
obtain refund terminate if and when a settlemc11 1
for the item received by the bank is or becomes
final (subsection (3) of section. 70A-4-211 a.nd.
subsections (2) and (3) of section 70A-4-2JH).
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It is there provided that a bank's right to revoke,

charge-back or obtain refund are conditional: the right
must be exercised before the provisional settlement for
an item becomes final, and the bank must give notification of dishonor to the customer by its midnight
Jeadline or within a longer reasonable time. This section
also provides that a settlement becomes final by meeting
the conditions specified in either 4-211 ( 3) or 4-213(2) or ( 3).
A clear reading of these sections is convincing
proof that that bank here allowed the provisional settlement to become final by failing to meet the following
conditions:

A. the bank did not give notification of dishonor by its midnight deadline or within a
longer reasonable time as required by 4-212
(1), above.
B. the bank did not meet the midnight deadline requirement of 4-211 ( 3) ( c).
C. the bank received a final settlement, according to the provisions of 4-211 ( 3) ( c), making
the bank accountable to its customer for the
full amount of the item, according to the provisions of 4-213 ( 3).
The provisions of 4-212 ( l) are set out above.
The provisions of 4-211 ( 3 ( c) are as follows:
" ( 3) A settlement for an item by. m:ans of
a remittance instrument or authorization to
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charge is or becomes a final settlement as to bot),
the person making and the person receiving 11 1,
settlement.
( c) If in a case not covered by subpara.
graphs (a) ?r (b) the person receiving tlit
settlement fails to seasonably present, forwaru
for collection, pay or return a remittance in
strument or authorization to it to charge befor,
i~s ~idnight deadline,-at such midnight dead. 1
lme.
·
The provisions of 4-213 ( 3) are as follows:
4-212 (3)

If a collecting bank receives a settlement IOi
an item which is or becomes final ( subsectior,
(3) of section 70A-4-211, subsection (2) 01
section 70A-4-213) the bank is accountable tr
its customer for the amount of the item and
any provisional credit given for the itern in a1
account with its customer becomes final."
1

I

The jury made specific findings that the bank wa\
"negligent because they failed to notify Lundahl's Im'
in the time prescribed by law, or a reasonable time, ab01
the second check not being honored by the Royal lla11i
of Canada." (Finding No. 3 to Interrogatory No.:
Rec. 44).

1
' •

The court not only approved the findings of th1 •
jury (Rec. 68) , but also made its own findings:
i
"That the plaintiff was negligent in certai1_
respects in its handling of said second check.
(Rec. 7 4, Conclusion of Law No. 5) .

I

1
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"That plaintiff failed to notify Lundahl's Inc.
in the time prescribed by law or a reasonable
time about Check Two not being honored by
the Royal Bank of Canada ... " (Rec. 70, Finding of Fact No. 8).

1.

1

d
11

II

I

These findings are conclusive proof that the requirements of 4-211 ( 3) {c), 4-212 ( 1), and 4-213 ( 3), above,
were not met by the Bank. And since those requirements were not met, the "provisional" settlement automatically became "final", and the Bank became the
owner of the check-for better or for worse. It acted
negligently, as the court and jury agreed, and mL1st
accept the legal consequences of its negligence.
Yes, despite the express statement of the Code
upon these issues, the court failed to understand it,
as evidenced by the court's assumption that the "notice"
requirement of 4-212 ( 1) was not mandatory but
optional. Continuing Finding No. 8, the Court stated
(Rec. 70) :
" ... but the court specifically finds that the
Defendants well knew or should have known of
Heathfield's financial instability and either insolvency or pending insolvency and that the
Plaintiff, except for said notice, kept Defendants fully informed as to the status of Check
Two . . . " (Emphasis added) .
The court admits "notice" was not given, yet in
the same sentence finds the Defendants were kept "fully
informed." The contradiction in terms is too obvious
lu believe the court understood the impact of what it
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said! The very reason the authors of the U nifor 1 ~,
Commercial Code required specific notice of dish 011111
be given was to prevent such confusion as existed lier,
where the Bank may have incorrectly assumed tli:
Defendants were "on notice". Obviously the cour'
here assurned the Defendq.nts were "on notice", for
stated that they "knew or should have known". Tlr
court imputes negligence to the Defendants if t]w, 1
were unaware of what it believes the disputed fael·
actually were, yet the Code does not allow such assump·
tions. It requires that timely notice must be given b:
the Bank or forfeit its right to revoke, charge-baeh.
or refund. The Code wisely recognizes that often timt'
timely notice will allow the depositor to contact th1
debtor and make new arrangements to cover the deb!
Here the Defendants and Mr. Heathfield all testitieJ
that timely notice would have prevented any loss a
all. But after two and a half months the conditions o:
the debtor corporation had changed substantially, un·
fortunately causing someone to bear the loss. And tl1t1
Code expressly provides that the loss falls upon tlr
negligent party who fails to meet the required standar l
of giving notice.
,

1

I

1

I

1

The court, again in disregard of the Code, furtht:'
held (Rec. 73, Conclusion No. 2) :
"That the provisions of the Commercial Codr
do not cover a situation such as this ·where th1.
bank customer solicits the aid and assistance oi
the bank in securing and collection a replacemc111
check for a prior lost check, where the customei
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knew or should have known that the drawer of
the check was in unsound financial straits and
either insolvent or on the verge of insolvency."
(Emphasis added) .
Then the court expressly contradicted the strict requirements of the Code by holding:
(Rec. 74, Conclusion No. 3):
"That even if the Comrnercial Code is applicable, the bank was not foreclosed from charging
hack Check Two upon its return unpaid, even
though it failed to use due care with respect to it,
and that the corporate Defendant's remedy is
in damages." (Emphasis added).

J,
1

ti

i

t'

I
, I

That finding of the court is obviously contrary to
the statutory requirements cited above, and contrary
to the court's own finding that the bank failed to give
the required notice. (Rec. 7, Finding No. 8) . These
conclusions of law simply cannot be reconciled with
the express provisions of Utah Code 70A-4-2ll, 4-212,
and 4-213, where this situation is directly provided for.
Basing its decision upon all of these errors, the court
concluded as a matter of law: (Rec. 7 4 conclusion No. 4)
"That in either event, the plaintiff is entitled
to a judgment against the corporate defendant
as prayed for in his complaint, to-wit: $7,206.07." (Emphasis added).

,(;'I "In either event" appears to acknowledge the fact t hat
thr !au;, does not allow such a charge back. There is no
way in the world such a finding can be proper after
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the jury had specifically found the Plaintiff was iw
entitled to a charge-back.
The Plaintiff below argued, and the court seemtu
to agree, that the determination by the jury decide 1
only the counter-claim and did not decide the claim
of the Plaintiff. But the two claims are inseparabh
connected, both arising from one isolated transactloi1.
If the Plaintiff must return the amount it improp·
erly charged back, it is because it did not comp!)
with the statutory requirements. And if the Bank doenot qualify to recover the full amount of the dishonoreJ
check, it cannot qualify to obtain any part of suci11
amount. (70A-4-213 (3).)
1

1

Therefore, the amount credited to the account of thr
Defendant must automatically be held to have become:
final account when the time limit for giving notice ex·
pi red. The bank can then have no further rights at a~
against the Defendants to the $8,100.00, because whe11
the settlement became final both parties were forerer
bound in the position which they \Vere in at that time
A charge back could not be justified because that right
was lost w~e~ the provisi~nal settlem~nt ~ecame final I
The authonties are unammous on this pomt. For ex,
ample, see Bender's Uniform Commercial Code Service. (
Forms-Procedures Volume, by Hart and 'Villier. I
(1968 revision) paragraph 43.05 (2), page 4-164:
"A collecting bank receiving a remittan~e must
by its midnight deadline, either pay or dishonor ,
it if on an account with the collecting bant i
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initiates its collection or forward it to its owner
(Section 4-211 ( 2) ) . Otherwise, the settlement
by remittance would become final at the expiration of that time and the bank will become accountable for the amount of the original item
whether or not the proceeds are ever collected.
(Section4-211(o) (a) (c)). (Emphasis added).

:u

J.'

I)

i

1

1

ln addition see A Tran.Yactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code, by \Villiam D. Hawkland,
published by the American Law Institute and American Bar Association, ( 1964 edition) , page 420:
"Except for the notification of any loss or delay
in transit of the item being collected, which must
be given within a reasonable time after discovery
thereof, the banli: must act with regard to its
other duties before its '' midniyht deadline" or
run the risk of having acted unseasonably ... "
(Emphasis added) .
The Bank had the burden in this case of proving that
its action was seasonable, but the jury found that the
action was not seasonable nor within the required time,
and the Bank was held to have "bought" the check.

One recent case interpreting this code requirement
11 is the 1965 Illinois Supreme Court decision of Rock
Island Auction Sales Inc. vs. Empire Packing Com', I pany, 32 Ill. 2d 269, 204 N.E. 2d 721, 18 ALR 3d 1368.
"I There a check for the purchase of 61 head of cattle was
deposited in one bank and was sent for collection to the
payor bank. The buyer's account in the payor bank was
inadequate to pay the amount on the check, but the payor
, . bank held the check, relying on the buyer's assurance
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that additional funds would soon be deposited. It heli!
the check from a Thursday to the following Tuesday. At
that time it marked the check "insufficient fw1ds" anJ
notified the depository bank that the check had bee
dishonored. The depository bank received the ched:
the following Thursday .About two months later th
buyer was adjudicated to be a bankrupt and the cheek
was never paid. In a suit by the seller of the cattle
against the payor bank it was held that where the item
was retained beyond the banking deadline the bank hriJ •
allowed the provisional settlement to become a final
settlement, and the Bank had lost whatever rights it
1
originally had to recover on the check. And that bank
held the dishonored check only one week, while in our
case the check was held for a period of two and a half
months.
1

11

,

1

Certainly the court erred in awarding the Plaintitl
any judgment because the settlement had become final
before the bank acted.
B. THE UTAH CODE PROVIDES THAT A
BANK HAS A RIGHT TO A "REFUND
ONLY 'i\THERE THE BANK IS NOT NEG·
LIGENT, AND THE JURY AND COUH'l
HAVING EACH EXPRESSLY FOUND
THE BANK WAS NEGLIGENT IN ITS
HANDLING OF DEFENDATS' CHECE
THE BANK HAD NO RIGHT TO A "REFUND."

42

There is a fundamental distinction between a
·chargehack" and a "refund", which provides a simple
solution to this dispute. As is stated by numerous
authorities which will be cited, a bank can "chargeback" an amount only where the depositor has at least
llrnt amount in that particular account. It is impossible
by definition to "chargeback" more funds than are
1111 Jeposit in an account.
However, if depositor has
insufficient funds to enable a bank to "chargeback"
a check, the Code than provides the bank the right to
obtain a "refund" from other funds of the depos~tor
who has been given temporary or provisional credit
for the check. The "refund" obviously must come from
monies not held in the bank account, for by definition
those monies held in the account can be "charged back',
momes not in the account must be obtained by "refund."

r

i

These clear distinctions are carefully pointed out
by the following authorities: First, in reading the Code
itself, Section 70A-4-212 (I) clearly allows a bank to
either revoke, chargeback, or obtain refund for a pro1isional settlement if the bank acts by its midnight
deadline. However, sub-section ( 4) specifically permits
a "chargeback" even where a bank is negligent, but
does not permit a "refund" under such conditions. That
~ection provides :
" ( 4) The right to charge-back is not affected
hy (a) prior use of the credit given for the item;
or ( b) failure by any bank to exercise ordinary
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care with respect to the item but any bank 1,
failing remains liable."
·
The distinction is further clarified in the Official Cullti
Comment to Section 4-212 ( 1962 Edition), page a~i
" No. 5. The rule of subsection ( 4) relatil!
to charge-back (as distinguished from claim 1
refund) applies irrespective of the cause of il 11
nonpayment, and of the person ultimately liahJ,
for nonpayment. Thus charge-baclt· is permittrn
even where nonpayment results from the depo.1
tory bank's own negligence. Any other rul1
would result in litigation based upon a claim fo1
wrongful dishonor of other checks of the cusl11·,
mer, with potential damages far in excess of tl11'
amount of the item. Any other rule would requir:
a bank to determine difficult questions of fact.
. . . " (Emphasis added) .
1

1

The authors of the Code there clearly prm·i<le tha:
negligence will be overlooked in allowing a chargebatl i
-but not so in the case of a refund. The reasons behin11
this dictinction are more fully expressed by the author•
of the Code in a more complete statement found i1
Bender's Uniform Commercial Code Service Reporl1 I
Digest, Hart and Willier, Vol. l (1968 Revision) :1"
page 361, under the topic of State Variations," tl:e i
1
editorial board mentions that California has adopted~ .
variation of one of the provisions, and in criticizin£
the California variation they state:
1

1

I

.

\

" 'The Editorial Board adopts the reasonm~:
of the California consultants in rejecting th 11 :
variation as follows ... 'Discussion. Subsectioni ·.
( l) , ( 3) , ( 5) and ( 6) of this section include thi
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right to obtain refund, as does the title to the
section. The amendment would add this to subsection ( 4). The State Bar Committee report
gives no reason for the proposed amendment,
and the California Bankers Committee did not
consider the amendment necessary.
e wonder
if the State Bar Committee did not believe that
the right to a refund had been inadvertently left
out of subsection ( 4) , since every other time this
section mentions the right to charge back it is
coupled with the right to refund. The Official
Comments, however, show that the omission of
the right of refund in this subsection ( 4) wa~
deliberate.

'¥

'This section gives a collecting bank that has
made a provisional settlement with its customer
the right to revoke the settlement if it fails to
obtain a settlement for an item and to charge
back the amount credited to the customer's account or to obtain a refund from its customer.
'Ve assume that the right to obtain a refund
will be used in cases when the credit has been
drawn on, or the provisional settlement was
made in cash or in some other manner that does
not produce a book credit subject to a chargeback. See 2 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm., Study of
the Uniform Commercial Code (1955) 1362.
The Official Comments indicate that subsection
( 4) allows a charge-back even in cases where
the nonpayment results from the depositary
bank's own negligence. The Comments state:
'Any other rule would result in litigation based
upon a claim for wrongful dishonor of other
checks of the customer, with potential damages
far in excess of the amount of the item. Any
other rule would require a bank to determine
difficult questions of fact.' If we assume that the
45

right of refund will be used when there is nr1
book credit in_ the customer's account, the polici
reason given for allowing a negligent <lepositar~
bank _a right of charge-back does not suppu;t
granti~1g it _a right of refund. In our opiniuq
there 1s no JUstiticatio11 for giving a negligtiti
depositary bank a right of refund agai11st a Ctl\tomer .' " (Emphasis added).
In analyzing this comment it is necessary to kee 11
in mind that 4-212 always allows for either a right ol
"charge back" or a right of "refund'' except for subset·
tion ( 4). So it might appear that "refund" was inadnrtently omitted from ( 4), but the Permanent Editori:tl ,
Board strongly denies such a charge by stating:
"The Official Code Comments, however, shm1
that the omission of the right of refund in tlti,
subsection ( 4) was deliberate."
They justify allowing a charge back by a negligent
bank by arguing it is necessary in today's busi11b,
world in order to keep commercial transactions fro111
becoming bogged down in needless double-checking 011
every item processed.

.

This rule is obviously intended to protect :t '
bank who charges back a check to an account a1111 1
causes outstanding checks to be dishonored became
of insufficient funds. In such a circumstance tlit
bank could be potentially liable for damages far iii 1
excess of the amount of the item if it acts negligenth
1

However, in this case the negligent Bank lost it
right to charge back under any circumstances, f nr i;
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aJ!rmed the provisional settlement to become final, as
i!iswssecl in Point II A supra. By failing to act before
the settlement became final, the Bank also automatic.illy
losl its right to a refund, as provided in subsection ( 1) .
These authorities, however, would here deny a
refund" for an additional reason: while they allow a
charge back" to a negligent bank in order to keep
commercial transactions moving within a bank, they
iiiicl no such commercial urgency to allow a negligent
bank a "refund". Their final statement clearly expresses
their view:
"In our opm1on, there is no justification for
giving a negligent depositary bank a right of
refund against a customer."
The Editorial Board here assumed that a "refund"
would be used
'' in cases where the credit has been drawn
on, or the provisional settlement was made in
cash or in some other manner that does not pro·
duce a book credit subject to a charge-back."

1

This is the obvious and reasonable assumption, for
if a ''charge-back" were available to the Bank it would
ohriously be used. If there were money in the Bank
11'hich could simply be withdrawn as a charge back,
it would be more quickly accomplished, less expensive
an<l less complicated than waiting for a depositor to
pay, either voluntarily or by court order, the amount
requested by the bank. But in cases where the bank
rannot simply charge back the deposit the bank must
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pursue its other legal remedy, which is to obtain 0
refund from the depositor. But in that situation therf
is no justifiable reason for allowing a negligent ba 1 ~
to obtain a refund, for that would require a second .,u
to correct the wrong done by the Bank's negligence
Here, however, both the court and jury expressly fou 11 i!
the Bank was negligent.
,
1

In following the view of the U.C.C. Editorial
Board, both findings should deny the Plaintiff any
right to a "refund" because it was negligent, in additiol!
to acting after the settlement became final.
The authorities unanimously agree with this inter
pretation of 4-212. In Anderson's Uniform Commncial Code, Vol. 2, page 77, the author states:
Section 4-212 :4 - Exercise of right.
In order to exercise the right of charging hacK
a credit provisionally given to its customer, the
collecting bank must act before its midnight demi·
line. If the bank does not learn of the facts jmti
f ying such action within time to act before that
deadline, it may act after the deadline .has passea
if it does so within a reasonable time after it '
learns of the facts justifying such action agairnt
its customer.
In any event the collecting bank must exer~i1t
its right to charge back or obtain a refund bet~rt
it has received any settlement for the item ,rh1cl1
is or becomes final.
I ts right to charge back or obtain a refund
from its customer is exercised by the colledlll.~
bank by returning the item or sending the cm! 1
mer notification of the facts.
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lu TJcnder's Uniform Commercial Code Service, FormsProcedures Y olume, Hart and "\,Yillier, ( 1968 Hevision), Section 43.07 ( 1) page 4-166:

"As each bank returns an item or sends notice,
it will charge back any provisional credit given
its transferor for the item (Sec. 4-212 ( 1) ) .
The depositary or an intermediary bank may
haYe allowed its immediate customer to draw
against the credit given even before receipt of
final settlement (proceeds). In such a case, the
bank has one of three choices:
( I ) Charge back against other funds in the cus-

tomer's account (sec. 4-212 ( 1), ( 4) ) .

( ~) Keep the item and demand refund from
the customer since the bank has a security
interest in the item to the extent of withdrawal or advances against it (secs. 4-201
(1), 4-208, 4-212 (1)

(2) ).

( 3) Keep the item and demand payment from

the o bligors

"

Certainly the C niform Commercial Code does present some unusual problems inasmuch as it has recently
been adopted in L'tah and some sections of it have not
been greatly interpreted. The trial judge found himself
in the difficult position of having to work with statutes
he could not understand, and so expressed himself
sereral times: (TR. 286) :
"THE C 0 CRT : On the legal questions there
are some advantages to the court making findings and letting somebody appeal, because if I
grant a new trial we still have this question of
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this c,har&'eback that's kind of indefiinite in thr
courts mmd. The Commercial Code or not, it~
so ambiguous that an ordinary country J wlrr
0
'
can't tell what they put in there.
·
l\:IR. lVIANN : It's been written by bankers.
Anybody that wants to make anything ambignous, take a banker.
THE COURT: Thank you.
lVIR. :MANN: Now when you get right down
to it, Judge, if this doesn't apply then the old
law applies, and Utah has several cases saying
that they've bought the check.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. OLSON: Oh, I don't think the court
in dica ted the Commercial Code didn't apply.

1

THE COURT:No. I just say I'm so con·.
fused about that language I can't tell what ih
about.
lVfR. OLSON: 'V ell, I am too.
MR. MANN: If that language won't apply ·
then the old cases would apply that say the)·
buy the check. .
(TR. 289):
.
)
"THE COURT: So there are three ways 11r
can jump. The more complicated it gets, ma~:be ,
the easiest way out of it is to grant a new tml ,
The disadvantage of that is that the Judge 11 ·
doubtful as to the law on the chargeback. ~lay
be I'd better make one of you appeal.
(TR. 292):
"THE COURT: Not only that, but I can't
find any definition of charge back. You people
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have been throwing that around here. And
'Vords and Phrases hasn't got a definition of a
charge back. Nobody knows what a chargeback
is .
.l\IR. OLSON: I've indicated in my brief that
a chargeback is the time-honored practice, and
the claim for refund is apparently the first time
it's ever been mentioned in anything.
THE COURT: But this suit isn't a chargeback proceeding.
.MR. OLSON: 'i\T ell, it certainly was.

"

t

l\IR. .MANN: It's a refund.

rJ I

THE COURT: Do you call this a chargeback? This is an action to recover on a.MR. OLSON: On an overdraft occurring by
reason of the chargeback.
THE COURT: Yes, but that isn't-well, in
one sense it isn't a chargeback action."

)'

'

:\'

1·r

Jt'

ti
ii.
\'·

The court apparently was undecided whether the
claim and action of Plaintiff was a chargeback, or an
attempt for a refund, or whether it came under subsection ( 5) which allows some other type of action or
proceeding. (TR. 294):
"THE COURT: Under this section it discusses chargeback and refund, and then under
five it says, '.May bring any other kind of an
action or proceeding.' So that under that theory
this action is probably brought under subdivision
five, if my memory is right of ~hat se~tion. It is·n't
a charge back action at all. Its a smt to .recover
on an independent theory, as I look at it.
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_MR. OLSON: 'Vell, it isn't. Actually 11
have ref erred t9 that section. It says, "The. failt

ure of a bank to make a chargeback does not
affect other remedies." That's what it says. Wt
elected to make a charge hack.

1

THE COURT: Let him read it. Read it out
loud.
MR. HADFIELD: It says, "Failure tii
charge back or claim refu~d does not affect other
rights of the bank against the customer or othtr
party."
lYIR. OLSON: And we charged back. ThP
evidence is very clear that we made one.
.
THE COURT: You couldn't make a chargeback. There was no money in the bank.
MR. OLSON: There was some. 'Ve got
and something.

8011 :

THE COURT: 'Vel, I know, but the jury ,
said you lost that by reason of negligence."
'Vhen the court submitted to the jury the inter·
rogatories to make special findings it then apparently
believed that the UCC did have application to nml
controlled this transaction. In the instructions to the
jury, (Rec. 37-43) the court defined for the jury the
fallowing terms: mid-night deadline, collecting Lan~.
customer, payor bank, depository hank, accord and sati~
faction. It also provided the jury with copies of sediom
4-202, 4-211, 4-212, 4-213 and defined "notice". None oi
these definitions or instructions would have been mean·
ingf ul unless the court expected the jury to consider
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the statutory provisions covered by the Uniform Commen:ial Code. Yet, after the jury had made findings
based on these instructions, the court then held in Condusions of law No. 2 that the provisions of the Commercial Code do not cover such a situation. And in
conclusion No. 3 the court concluded that even if the
Co<le does apply the bank had the right to proceed in
spite of the denial of such a right by the Code. The
Plaintiff should be denied any claim for refund-or
for what amounts to a refund, regardless of the title
under which such a claim is made.

CONCLUSION
011 :

11

Y •

er·
th

For all of the foregoing reasons it was clearly error
to grant judgment against the corporate Defendant,
nnd this court should reverse the lower court as to any
Judgment granted to the Plaintiff and direct the lower
court to enter a judgment in favor of the Defendant
In keeping with the verdict of the jury.
MANN AND HADFIELD
Walter G. Mann
Reed W. Hadfield
Richard F. Gordon
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